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Starting point: John Rawls
• John Rawls’s ‘principles of justice’:
1. Principles that would be chosen under suitably idealized 
circumstances (the Original Position)
2. Principles that democratic citizens as free and equals agree on
• In a Well-Ordered society, democratic citizens may:
• Have different comprehensive doctrines  disagreement
• Share the same conception of justice  agreement
• Liberal principle of legitimacy: “our exercise of political power 
is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a 
constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason.” (PL)
Jeremy Waldron
• Jeremy Waldron’s ‘circumstances of politics’:
1. The fact of disagreement;
2. The need for cooperation.
• Need for cooperation  we ought to know how to 
coordinate, that is, according to which rules we are going to 
act in society;
• Fact of disagreement  we disagree over what these rules 
ought to be.
• Against Rawls: there is NO publicly shared conception of 
justice, only publicly shared decision-making procedures!
Democracy and disagreement
• Disagreement over both conceptions of the good and the 
conception of justice  disagreement on what the best 
decisions are and over what counts as best decision
• Democracy = decision-making procedure that can settle 
disagreement by giving the same weight to each person 
principle of fairness
But why? 
• David Enoch: we disagree over procedures as well  over 
what counts as fair procedure and over whether procedures 
should be fair (instead of lending correct outcomes, for 
instance)
We agree on what the 
right decisions are
We disagree over what 
the right decisions are
We know that we 
agree/disagree
We coordinate on a 
decision-making 
procedure agreed on by 
all  would we still 
need democracy? 
We need a decision-
making procedure to 
settle our disagreement 
 democracy has 
normative value
We do not know 
that we 
agree/disagree
We need a decision-
making procedure in 
order to discover 
whether we agree or 
not  democracy has 
both normative and 
epistemic value
We need a decision-
making procedure in 
order to discover
whether we agree or 
not  democracy has 
both normative and 
epistemic value
Line of the argument…
Choice of decision-making procedure: we need a decision-making procedure that 
confers legitimacy to outcomes over which we disagree. 
Fact of disagreement: we do not agree over which specific decisions are justified in 
themselves.
Need for cooperation: we need collectively binding decisions, that all ought to 
comply with.
… so far
Justification and Legitimacy: a proper justification of democratic decision-
making confers legitimacy on its outcomes, so that a certain outcome may be 
unjustified in itself, but still legitimate in virtue of the procedure that issued it.
Pervasive disagreement: either we disregard disagreement over procedures; 
or we need a justification to account for democracy against other decision-
making procedures.
Justifications of democracy
• Since we disagree over outcomes we need procedures in 
order to issue legitimate outcomes;
• Since we disagree over procedures, we need a good 
justification of democracy in order to grant it the power to 
confer normativity on its outcomes;
• Two possible justifications of procedures:
• Instrumentalism;
• Intrinsicalism.
Instrumentalism
• General definition: procedure is justified insofar as it produces 
the right outcomes;
• There is an independent value according to which we can 
evaluate democratic outcomes;
• If the procedure achieves on average the correct outcomes, it 
is overall justified;
• Not all outcomes are justified, but they are all legitimate and 
most of them are also justified.
Intrinsicalism
• General definition: a procedure is justified insofar as it realizes a 
certain value in the way it is worked out;
• There is an independent value that applies to procedures, rather 
than to outcomes;
• If we do treat each other within the procedure according to such 
value or set of values, then the procedure realizes this value and is 
justified thereof;
• All outcomes are legitimate, but their justification is left to other 
criteria applying to outcomes (that are not publicly available).
Quick comparison
Instrumentalism
• Procedure justified in 
virtue of its outcomes;
• There is an independent 
value which applies to 
outcomes;
The relations between the 
procedure and such value 
is contingent.
Intrinsicalism
• Procedure justified in 
virtue of how it treats 
participants to it;
• There is an independent 
value which applies to 
the procedure;
The relationship between 
the procedure and such 
value is necessary.
Beyond monism
• Both justifications so far considered are procedural forms of 
legitimacy (Justified procedures  legitimate outcome).
• All outcomes are legitimate, but not all are justified:
• Instrumentalism: most of them are;
• Intrinsicalism: irrelevant whether they are or not.
• Monism: one criterion of assessment for the justification of 
democracy (either outcomes or procedures themselves).
• Dualism: not a single criterion, but two:
• One applying to the procedure itself (whether instrumental or 
intrinsic);
• One applying to the procedure tendency to produce correct 
outcomes / to the content of individual outcomes.
Dualistic accounts
• Democratic outcomes in order to be legitimate ought to 
satisfy a double criterion:
• They ought to be the issue of a justified procedure;
• They ought not to violate the values upon which the justification 
of democracy rests.
• E.G. Thomas Christiano’s public equality: democratic 
outcomes are legitimate insofar as:
• They are produced by a democratic procedure;
• They do not violate public equality.
Epistemic conceptions of 
democracy
• Democratic outcomes in order to be legitimate ought to be 
produced by procedures that:
• Are intrinsically justified;
• Produce on average correct results.
• E.G. David Estlund’s epistemic instrumentalism: democratic 
outcomes are legitimate insofar the procedure that issues 
them is justified:
• Intrinsically: it is acceptable to a qualified legitimation pool;
• Instrumentally: it produces on average correct outcome.
• VS. Fabienne Peter’s epistemic intrinsicalism: there is an 
independent value applying to procedures that justifies 
democracy as necessary for treating others as both moral and 
epistemic equals.
Shortfall of intrinsicalism
• Intrinsicalism usually does not require a certain threshold of 
competence/rationality on democratic citizens as procedures 
alone are both necessary and sufficient to make outcomes 
legitimate.
However
• This means that democratic outcomes are legitimate (hence 
they ought to be obeyed) even if grossly unjust 
• Over-legitimation: outcomes are legitimate even when they 
contradict the values that justify democratic procedures 
themselves;
• Under-legitimation: outcomes are never legitimate, if the 
procedure is too idealized to be realized in practice.
Shortfall of instrumentalism
• Instrumentalism is usually challenged for assuming an 
independent criterion for the validity of outcomes that does 
not really take disagreement into account.
However
• All dualistic, epistemic-instrumentalist and simple  
instrumentalist accounts face another problem: they heavily 
depend on how people behave within the procedure;
• People are completely self-interested/morally flawed/highly 
irrational or incompetent  outcomes = legitimate BUT 
unjustified  procedure that produces most unjustified 
outcomes than not = unjustified.
Tentative proposal
• Justification of democracy ought not be one  plural 
justification that appeals to different levels:
1. Normative/moral justification: democracy is the right way to 
treat people;
2. Epistemic justification: democracy is the most reliable 
decision-making procedure;
3. Prudential justification: democracy is in most people’s long-
term interest.
• Different reasons to take democratic procedures as justified 
and authoritative  legitimacy of outcomes and citizens’ 
obligation to them.
Why a plural justification
• Convergentist model of justification:
1. Agreement on normative values behind democracy, as equal 
respect, political equality or autonomy  normative 
function of democracy;
2. Disagreement on normative values behind democracy 
epistemic function of democracy;
3. Disagreement on normative values and on their relevance
to politics  prudential function of democracy.
• Different ways to engage in the democratic game and to 
acknowledge democracy as legitimate authority  obligation-
generating on citizens.
Benefit of the proposal
• With respect of intrinsicalism: it concedes that there can be 
unjustified outcomes that are still legitimate  real problem: 
what kind of dissent or civil disobedience is allowed – given 
democratic citizens’ obligation?
• With respect to simple instrumentalism, epistemic-
instrumentalism and dualism: it includes a minimal account of 
democratic obligation  a set of actions required of citizens in 
order for democracy to work
• With respect to both: it allows for democracy to be justified 
according to democratic citizens’ motivation.
• What shortcomings…?
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